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The Art of Dissent: Parody, Travesty and Irony in Late Soviet Culture 
Dmitri Shalin 
 
Irony is the favorite tool of Russian postmodernists fighting discourse 
totalitarianism. They wield it like a crowbar to pry open in the simulacrum, 
to tear down the Potemkin portable villages built by forced discursive 
labor. Every new blow the ironist strikes against the official reality 
reaffirms his intonational freedom amidst the most coercive discourse. An 
ultimate weapon of the spiritual proletariat, irony proves to the intellectual 
that he is a subject rather than an object of discourse. Alas, ironic vigil 
takes its toll. The self busily disclaiming identity with itself loses track of 
what it really is. It knows not how to commit, empathize, make believe. 
Deconstructive irony is a radical epoche whose subject lost control over 
his destiny and no longer knows how to throw the parodic stick shift into 
reverse. Irony is indeed a double-edged sword: its corrosive edge cuts 
those who evade pathos and greets with cynicism constructive 
engagement. Irony can be construed as a dissimulative gesture signaling 
to the audience that the individual's face is but a mask, that discursive 
performance is not to be taken literally. Along with this gesture comes a 
deep aversion to direct speech. The postmodernist is someone who can't 
say I love you without immediately putting quotation marks around his 
words. He wants to distance himself from direct speech, ostensibly to 
protect himself from discourse's totalitarian proclivities and poshlost, but 
in the process he does violence to his own voice, suppresses its non-ironic 
modalities. 
Irony is variously present in such literary genres as satire, parody and 
travesty. Its vocal counterpart is pathos, which thrives in epic and lyrical 
genres. These are two poles in a vocal continuum that we use to construct 
and deconstruct our social worlds. Without going into detailed discussions 
and definitions, let me say that satire scorns, parody mocks, travesty 
feigns, irony winks, bathos affects, and pathos makes believe. (I hesitate 
to place irony squarely in this continuum as it partakes in many genres, 
but I feel it could function as a particular speech genre, in which case it 
might have a rightful places somewhere between parody and travesty). 
Judged from this continuum, ironic modes are no more important for our 
sane existence than pathetic modes. Irony comes in handy when 
discourse grows too solemn and pious. Pathos is called for when discourse 
becomes derisive, irreverent and sacrilegious. Irony is indispensable as a 
hygiene to protect our faces underneath official mask, to poke fun at self-
important heroes and repressive institutions. We need self-parody "to 
disabuse others of the very ideas we press on them," as Mikhail Epstein 
put it felicitously (see his letter to me in our conference file). Tieck, 
Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Herzen and Kierkegaard paid homage to irony's 
magic touch. "He who does not understand irony and has no ear for its 
whisperings," wrote Kierkegaard in his doctoral dissertation, "lacks eo 
ipso what might be called the absolute beginnings for the personal life, 
lacks the bath of rejuvenation. He does not know the invigoration and 
fortification which, should the atmosphere become too oppressive comes 
from lifting oneself up and plunging into the ocean of irony, not in order to 
remain there, of course, but healthily, gladly, lightly to clad oneself again" 
(Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press [1841] 1965 p. 339). But irony ceases to be a defensive 
tactic and grows noxiously offensive when it leaves no room for the lyrical 
"I" and shows contempt for tact, adopts an in-your-face attitude. 
Seriousness is OK when it knows its limits, Bakhtin tells us. I would argue 
that the same applies to parody and irony. 
Laughter has its violent side. Sometimes we need pathos to counter it, to 
extricate our words from quotation marks and turn another's speech into 
your own. Everyone is an ironist these days, Alexander Block commented 
earlier this century, and added that now it would take courage not to be 
ironic. Indeed, pathos requires courage when the time has come to 
suspend doubt and make a commitment; it builds bridges and makes 
fantasy come true; it calls for empathy and affirms solidarity with the 
other; it sets you into an e-motion without which your social construction 
falls apart. Just as irony, pathos can grow offensive, arrogant and 
coercive. It happens whenever it seeks to impose on others a politically 
correct line, frowns on unorthodox discourses, and treats everyone who 
begs to differ as a misfit whose consciousness needs to be raised. Every 
society seems to go through cycles where the ironic or the pathetic mode 
takes ascendence among its members. Cynicism and ethical commitment 
trade places. Late Soviet and early postcommunist culture have been 
marked by the excessive irony whose Homeric energies will be felt for a 
long time. But there are signs that its supremacy is withering away, as 
more ambivalent, lyrical modes come to the fore. 
Given this historical dynamics, it seems prudent to ask if Russian 
postmodernists are mistaking their sordid historical conditions for the 
primordial nature of being. The schizophrenic discourse they embraced 
may have something to do with the schizophrenic realities surrounding 
them on all fronts. There is enough inanity in the world to make me 
wonder whether humanity will eventually succumb to chaos. The bubble of 
sanity we inhabit can burst at any time. But whatever the outcome, I 
doubt it will have been destiny. We are participant observers in the world 
historical drama, and our actions just might tip the scale and make one 
outcome or the other more certain. 
Venichka looks around and sees nothing but chaos. He cries for help -- 
none is forthcoming from his fellow men. He turns his eyes heavenly -- 
the Lord has forsaken him. We are led to believe that there is no hope in 
sight. But is it a fact or is it a figment of his alcoholic imagination? Was 
chance his true destiny or did he seal his own fate by yielding to the 
forces of chaos? Was his flight into insanity an act of courage or a pathetic 
copout? One can argue that postmodernism simply inoculates us from the 
insanity of this world, one can make the case that it helps spread the 
disease. As I said on various occasions, postmodernism is much too 
diverse a current to lend itself to easy generalization; there is much in it 
that is exciting, even wise. Still, I feel some of its proponents take 
themselves too seriously. The irony is that postmodernism threatens to 
become political correctness for our times. The grandest narrative of them 
all, it spawns the repressive tolerance once attributed to the liberal 
establishment. Its proponents reject maximalism, absolutism, 
totalitarianism but they do so in a curiously maximalist, absolutist and 
totalizing fashion. One is reminded of Turgenev's hero who sets out to 
prove that everything in this world is relative. "Are you sure about that?", 
he is asked. To which he replies: "ABSOLUTELY!" 
Like a weather vane that dutifully follows the wind's direction and serves 
as its faithful index, conceptualists feel the bygone era's violent winds, 
which weathered their bodies and dried up their souls. Like a dumb idol 
forced to partake in a pagan ritual through its very iconicity, 
conceptualists show more than a fleeting family resemblance to idols and 
idolatry they mock. Like a jester who feigns it doesn't hurt at all when 
somebody slaps him in the face, conceptualists escape into irony to cover 
up the stinging pain from a ghastly spectacle in which they were 
symbolically implicated. Their faces are contorted in a grimace signifying 
disengagement, but their expressions are iconic as much as they are 
ironic. It is this bio-social semiotic of postmodernist aesthetics in general 
and Russian conceptualism in particular that interests me greatly. Icon, 
index, symbol -- these are the three basic sign forms. Postmodernists 
come conceptualists work closely with all three, but they pretend that 
their icons and indexes are mere "linguistic symbols," whose own body is 
supposed to be indifferent to the events they signify. Yet, they hardly 
escape the culture's inexorable iconicity and indexicality. The conceptualist 
simulating gesture has an unmistakably dissimulating ring to it. The joke 
may be on the joker, after all. 
Baudrillard's notion of "simulacrum" needs to be complemented by 
another one -- "dissimulacrum." If simulacrum is a copy masquerading as 
reality, then dissimulacrum is reality masquerading as fiction. A simulator 
pretends that something is there when it is not. A dissimulator pretends 
that there is nothing when there is something. The former wishes to pass 
his mask for a face, the latter is trying to convince us that his is "really" a 
mask. One is busy imitating enthusiasm, constructive activity, and 
meaningful social routines, the other rushes to disassemble or dissemble 
them even before they are brought into being. One fakes total presence, 
the other feigns total absence. In short, the two are twins; theirs is a 
siblings' rivalry; the one can hardly do its job without the other, as they 
continue to pretend that they pretend or that they don't. Culture does not 
so much lose its body in these exercises as it whittles down its 
emotionally-laden substance and masks its all too real deformities. The 
postmodernist escape from soma into the playfully linguisticized discourse 
strikes me as a symptom. Of what? 
The postmodern ironists' dis-ease with their own materiality indicates a 
spirit that has grown weary of its gravity-bound incarnations. Russian 
conceptualists are particularly at home in this strenuous self-denial, their 
attitude fed by centuries of neglect and denigration that body had been 
exposed to in Russian culture. I see this attitude in early Russian monks 
who mortified their flesh and preached silence as the highest form of 
devotion. It is evident in Vladimir Soloviev and Nikolai Fedorov with their 
quest for degendered existence and purely spiritual love. Its traces could 
be found in Nikolai Berdiaev and Alexander Block who experimented with 
the idea of sexless marriage, mixed with khlysty, and evinced profound 
ambivalence about human flesh. The Russian dis-ease with the body and 
its mundane functions is nowhere more evident than in the Russian 
sectarian movement. Its members' self-flagellational vigils were designed 
to elevate spiritual culture over its profane embodiments, but there was 
enough room for doubt left as to whether the secret pleasures the 
participants experienced in the process were entirely spiritual. Theology 
and art seem to work here hand-in-hand, disembodying culture, 
sublimating it into a symbolic apparitions, castigating the body as an 
unsavory vessel for the sacred soul. Or as you put it yourself so 
eloquently, "it is reality, brimming with health, full and round to the eye, 
that would rather serve the demonic seduction of humanity, turning it 
toward the earthly path and away from the celestial" (p. 58). The critique 
you offer toward the end of your book shows your more nuanced attitude 
toward postmodernism and conceptualism, but I think it needs to go 
further in thematizing the Russian predilection for cultural disembodiment. 
The disembodied ideal of culture I detect in Russian conceptualism is 
matched by the dismembered concept of language, the disemboweled 
notion of semiotics, and the dissembling blueprint for ethics. All these 
features are consistent with the postmodernist corpus. 
Take, for instance, postmodernist linguistics. It is thoroughly Saussurian 
in its binary thinking. The signifier is directly linked here with the signified, 
the sign is explicated through other signs, the meaning is transparent to 
the interpreter's gaze, and speech is a function of grammatical code 
enciphered in language. The semiotics that grew from this view has no 
use for human body, emotions, and voice; it dissolves semeiosis into 
voiceless discourse that speaks the speaker and signifies the signifier. 
Humans are always the signified here. They re-produce the linguistic code 
rather than produce it. Everything that could be said and is worth saying 
has already been said. We can only mouth the episteme and replicate the 
hyperreal copy. An original uttering is a theoretical impossibility. 
This postmodernist creed contrasts with the semiotics developed by 
Charles Peirce and his pragmatist followers, who prefer the triadic model 
to the binary one. The relationship between the signifier and the signified 
is mediated here by an interpretive act, which completes the natural 
semeiosis. Our interpretive practices endow the word with meaning and 
breathe life into the inanimate linguistic machinery. Without the signifying 
act, the word -- language -- signifies nothing. It comes to mean 
something in deed and in situ, when the subject picks from its possible 
senses the one most needed and takes it to mean something definitive, 
not for all but very specific practical purposes. According to Peirce, James, 
Dewey, and Mead, signification is not just a mental act: it could be a 
feeling, an action, a habit which tests the meaning we assign to things 
and situations against their obdurate properties and social valences. 
Linguistic signification grows from prelinguistic, nonsymbolic forms of 
semeiosis, which humans share with their protosapient ancestors. Our 
vocal gestures are implicated here – a not as surface phenomena akin to 
droning and muttering but as bio-social events deeply rooted in our body. 
Voice, golos, is not just a capacity to golosovat, make empty political 
utterances. It is vested in the human body and it goes to its emotional 
core. Unlike discourse, voice exists in real time and space and triggers 
momentous physiological processes. Activated by our vocal cords and 
tongue, our voice reverberates with feelings, quivers with emotions, it has 
a certain diction that usually tells us more than the self-conscious subject 
seeks to communicate. Even when voice simulates and dissimulates, it has 
an undeniable presence; it lets us in onto real events which no ironic 
discourse could camouflage. (I shall note parenthetically that 
dramaturgical act is always transcendental and transcendental act is 
always dramatic). Distorted, tortured though Gorbachev's glasnost might 
have been, it was no mere "voiceness," as you seem to imply (p. 97). It 
gave hope to many people who were not completely jaded or lulled by 
decades of ideological droning. The violent shrieks and howls we are 
hearing ever since are genuine indexes, whose bio-social semiotics 
bespeaks a repressed culture that is finally baring its emotional wounds. 
In this reckoning, it would seem to make more sense to talk about 
"ideospeech" than "ideolanguage." Not just because Russian ideological 
tetrads translate so well into other languages, or because shrewd 
politicians and con-artists have deployed them since Thucydides, though 
these are weighty portends. The point is rather that doublespeak reveals 
itself in paralinguistic tell-tell signs even more vividly than in its lexical 
and syntactic patterns. I agree with you that ideology is first and foremost 
about power, but I don't think language is to blame. Ideology engenders a 
distorted emotional culture of intolerance and hate, which bursts through 
and makes its hegemonic presence felt in ideospeech acts. It is at this 
embodied level that debased culture shows to us its true physiognomy. 
We feel it in our twisted guts, faces contorted into fake smiles, 
expressions of hate frozen in our eyes, and other emotionally vested value 
judgments we pass on the world and our selves. We can simulate and 
dissimulate these semiotic indexes, but they are a presence no 
deconstructive finesse could erase. The recourse to irony does not help 
the matter. It adds a new cycle to the dissmimulational spiral and helps 
hide the snarled web of the ironist's motivations. "Irony is almost 
inevitable where mind is at cross-purpose with the heart," says Georgy 
Fedotov (Sudby i Grekhi Rossii, Vol. 2, p. 344). If so, then the 
conceptualists' ironic vigil hints at a crying gap between their heartfelt 
emotions audible in their voices and anesthetized minds inscribed in their 
discourse. 
Does conceptualist art imitate life or is it the other way around? I do not 
know nearly enough about conceptualists' personal habits to have the 
answer, but I would venture a hypothesis that there is a linkage between 
their lives and their art, that the conceptualists' ironic detachment from 
ideological hyperreality spills over into their relationships with flesh and 
blood people. Conceptualist art, and more broadly postmodernist 
discourse, engenders a certain ethos: the in-your-face ethics of putdown 
and insult. When Baudrillard says, "I don't want culture, I spit on it" 
(Forget Foucault, p. 81), you can clearly sense venom in his voice and 
visualize an indexical gesture. Conceptualist artists mimic the same 
gesture, as they settle the old accounts with their tormentors. 
Conceptualists are not as violently inclined as some radical 
postmodernists, but I sense a passive-aggressive attitude in their voice 
which heaps scorn on those who don't see things their way. 
Conceptualist art is hyperrepresentational, in that it seeks to convey not 
things themselves but their ideological essences. Conceptualism sucks into 
itself bits and pieces of reality, and in the process purifies its objects from 
humanity they once embodied. So, what is left is a cipher, an ideological 
code, cartoonish characters set into motion by the omnipotent puppet 
master. Hence, Kibirov's "Speech by the Comrade Chernenko," where his 
astringent imagination brings to life the living corpse of the General 
Secretary addressing a Soviet writers' meeting. Everybody in this clever 
satire is a nincompoop. There is a slew of well known characters who show 
up at the scene, decked out with the all too familiar claptrap: Evtushenko, 
"barely able to hold back his feelings"; Bergolts and Inber, "wailing like 
common harridans;" Samoilov, "applauding nobly with restraint"; 
Erenburg, Pasternak, Rozhdestvensky take their turns, dutifully signing 
their obeisance to the party line; they are followed by Block, Puskin, 
Lermontov, Dante, and Homer who make a brief appearance to give the 
happening a phantasmagoric dimension. A few tangible details crop up 
here and there (Pasternak looks like a "startled child," Rasputin "for a 
moment forgot about his beloved Lake Baikal "), but these quasi-personal 
tidbits only underscore the spectacle's studied one-dimensionality. It must 
be real fun to jerk these straw men and women around, dissolve them in 
the ideological formalin, burn them in effigies. One longs for a noncomic 
relief, but none is forthcoming. 
While the Soviet Writers' Union was in place, such a spoof had real bite. 
When the same method of turning people into their linguistic shadows is 
employed today, it becomes an ideology, an ethical imperative to cut 
everybody down to size. Lev Rubinstein's extensive catalogue of 
commonplace utterances that he assembles on index cards and reads in a 
more or less random fashion implies that people are walking cliches with 
no emotional substance to their verbalizations. We are all cultural dupes, 
the writer tells us, eager to consume linguistic garbage and bound to 
reproduce unreflexively the existing order of things. We feign being alive, 
for there is no reality behind our spurious yearnings. We simulate with 
vengeance, all of us, except maybe for conceptualists themselves, who 
have figured out the charade and managed to escape the common dupery 
through their ironic overextension of idiomatic commonplaces. I am yet to 
come across a postmodernist willing to say, "I am a cultural dupe, wired 
to the media, bent on mindless consumption, and faithfully reproducing 
hegemonic institutions." Ilya Kabakov comes closest to admitting that 
much. When Oskar Rabin approached him regarding participation in the 
famous Bulldozer exhibition of 1974, Kabakov turned him down and 
allegedly said, "All my life I have crawled on four feet. I stand up on four 
feet. And you are trying to stand like a normal person on two legs" 
(Komar and Melamid, in Baigell and Baigell, eds., Soviet Dissident Artists, 
p. 268). This is a graphic -- iconic -- description, hinting at the toll Soviet 
culture exacted from its artists. But even Kabakov couldn't say it in all 
sincerity; his confession was tongue-in-cheek; his artistry expressed a 
thoroughly nonconformist spirit. The postmodernists' stance implies that 
its practitioners are autonomous subjects, endowed with taste, 
perspective, and critical judgment. Why, then, deny critical agency to 
others? 
As the above example suggests, language furnishes us with all purpose 
linguistic frames that mean everything and nothing at the same time, and 
that to mean something, they have to be appropriated by speakers and 
deployed in situ and in actu. Words and concepts are but samples of 
frozen semantic sperm gathered in dictionary tubes, stored away in 
textbook vaults, and waiting to be fertilized in speech acts. For a 
conception to occur, there must be speakers lending their voices to 
impersonal discourses in mundane situations where chosen meanings are 
acted upon in earnest make-believe. 
Postmodernists qua conceptualists fail to imagine that "concept" is more 
than a purely verbal device -- konzept. Concept is a seed of future reality, 
a semantic chromosome that carries within itself a genetic code waiting to 
be decoded in speech. Thanks to our concepts, we can "conceive" things 
as meaningful objects and populate with their namesakes landscapes in 
our emergent uni-verse, literally "one verse" recited by those who inhabit 
a given universe. New verses mean new uni-verses. Were it not for 
embodied speech practices, the luscious landscapes comprising our 
universe would break apart into randomly scattered objects. Every 
meaningful event is conceived on location, in a situation implicating the 
other, where logos can satisfy its prodigious erotic appetites and where 
idea and matter can penetrate each other, germinating in a definite thing. 
Once conceived, things don't exist as meaningful objects for all eternity; 
they have to be reconceived with every human encounter. One thing may 
turn up as many objects, and one object could be impersonated by many 
different things. When particulars are brought into being as concrete 
universals, they have a certain emotional afterglow, a kind of birthmark 
which distinguishes a thing for us from a thing in itself. This 
metamorphosis requires a social setting and a live transaction, without 
which our language games remain sterile. 
The endless play of difference we find in deconstructionist texts occasions 
few extratextual events. One sign begets the other but scarcely any 
engenders the inhabitable universe. The offsprings that come from 
deconstructionist texts are typically stillborn, unable to stir our feelings, 
plunge us into e-motions, move us. Whatever embryo of meaning is 
conceived in the conceptualist mind is promptly killed by its deconstructive 
imagination. The latter doesn't like to carry its babies to term, relying on 
irony as an all-purpose contraceptive device. No sooner does sentiment 
escapes its rib cage, that conceptualists pluck its feathers and clip its 
wings with their ironic tweezers. Deconstructive irony is a dissimulating 
gesture, a dissimulacrum which puts our self into quotation marks to 
prevent it from being taken seriously and engendering a meaningful 
reality. It is a functional equivalent of birth control -- a symbolic rubber 
wrapped around emotions to make sure no conception will take place. 
Notice that Russian conceptualism wasn't always radically deconstructive. 
It started as an inspired satire on socialist realism and its pompous style -
- a "nostalgic socialist realism," pioneered, or at least popularized, by 
Komar and Melamid. Like a grown up stumbling on a wooden horse he 
rode with zest in childhood, Russian conceptualists look back at their 
young pioneer neckties and realize in astonishment that they once wore 
them with pride. Komar and Melamid's childhood is still glowing with warm 
memories of hot pursuits and boy scout exploits, but this benign 
sentiment soon gives way to more conflicted emotions. Ambivalence 
merges with resentment, resentment breeds irritation, irritation shades 
into contempt and occasions a smirk at any one who might still harbor the 
feelings once felt by conceptualists, who have finally grown too big for 
their britches. In developed conceptualist art one finds little humor and 
plenty of sarcasm aimed at inane rituals and coercive discipline imposed 
on the not so young pioneers by their stalwart jailers/teachers. 
What gives real pathos to conceptualists' irony is their first-hand 
experience with the communist grand narrative. As all Soviet citizens, 
Russian conceptualists were forced to put on uniforms and dramatize 
inane realities as meaningful and sane. We know what it feels like when 
you lend your face to the cause you loath or look the other way as 
somebody else's soul is tortured on the racks. That's when irony is 
summoned to help abort the bastardly reality conceived against our will. 
But the imbecilic creatures we abort are our offsprings. Every one of us, 
conceptualists included, could be slapped with a paternity suit, for we did 
take part in the debased discourse and helped nurture socialist realities. It 
is therefore a double irony that we witness here. Those very faces that 
produced hateful reality labored hard to cut it down to size with their 
ironic gestures. We could be charged in "consorting with an enemy" as 
well as taken to court for "illegal abortion." As a matter of fact, some 
especially brave and brazen ironists among us were taken to court for that 
very crime, known in common parlance as "anti-Soviet agitation and 
propaganda." 
Putting this into semiotic terms, we can say that ironic gesture is always 
iconic and indexical, that it implicates ironists in the reality they bracket. 
You can distance yourself from the mask you are wearing, but your own 
face is sucked into the dramaturgical act. Thus, quotation marks you place 
around swearing (a racial slur, a blasphemous word) does not prevent 
some of it from rubbing off on you. Andy Warhol assumes an ironic 
posture when he says that artists who cannot sell their art are failures, 
but he means it more than he pretends. He purports to debunk 
consumerism of late capitalism, but sets up an "artistic factory" which 
churns out millions of dollars' worth of commodities that have been sold 
on capitalist markets. While Woody Allen mocks himself in front of the 
audience, he manages to transcend his predicament, but the relief he 
gains is temporary; it lasts while he is performing on stage in front of an 
audience. He has to keep jesting and parodying himself, lest somebody 
notices that he only pretends to pretend, that his willfully donned mask of 
a meshuganah from Brooklyn is really a naked face contorted in self-
loathing. Irony helps vent anger and dull the pain, but the relief is short-
lived. It is a plague and a therapy at the same time, it is a spectacle which 
lets us fight pain with laughter, a carnival where you can wear the mask 
of otherness pretending it is not your real self. Postmodern ironists are 
bent on turning life into a never-ending carnival where they can don their 
masks in a never-ending game of dissimulation. But the ploy threatens to 
fall apart and bury compulsive ironists under its debris. Just as people 
stricken with leprosy in the medieval times turned their stigma into a 
mark of a true chosenness, decontructive ironists claim that their stigma 
is a blessing in disguise. They are postmodern stigmatics who endeavor to 
bear the cross for all of us but end up being crushed by the burden. (Did 
you notice that jesters and ironists are very sad creatures who are apt to 
fall into the blackest depression?). 
The radically deconstructive irony that sprouted in the postmodern age 
has little resemblance to its romantic predecessor. Ironic detachment 
ceased to be a defensive strategy designed to protect one's face beneath 
the official mask and is transformed into an offensive weapon used to 
clobber over the head anyone who begs to differ. It is no longer self-irony 
hinting at the self that it is at odds with itself, but a diatribe directed at 
the lifeworld and the dupes inhabiting it. For all their talk about the other 
and alterity, postmodernists don't have much respect for the sanctity of 
the other person's selfhood, which they put down and eviscerate with their 
ironic stratagems. Deconstructive irony is cheerless, its playfulness is 
forced, its voice growing hoarser by the minutes as it mounts an all-out 
assault on meaning and meaningfulness. Sharpened on the anvil of 
deconstructive irony, conceptualism turns into the art of universal 
putdown, which leaves an indelible mark on its practitioners. Prigov shows 
little mercy and takes no prisoners. Kabakov tells us our life is garbage. 
Sorokin is bent on painting us as living corpses. Rubinstein is convinced 
that we are walking cliches. This conceptualist art evinces few traces of 
nostalgia. Early Kibirov has a gentler touch, but even he couldn't resist the 
temptation of reducing people to their cartoonish shadows. He laments 
the plight of his protagonists, but his tears are mostly fake. 
Today, conceptualism is no longer a mere epater la bourgeoisie. It 
becomes far more ambitious as conceptualists take on being as such. 
Unsheathed before our eyes is a metaphysical irony that contrives to 
unmask the entire universe of meaning as a fraud. Conceptualism casts its 
jaundiced eye at the world and finds it lacking in any credibility. Every 
political platform is a lie, postmodernists tell us, every paradigm is a 
hoax; there is no being, only emptiness and death lurking beneath our 
phony selves and feigned enthusiasms. Whatever identity we claim to 
possess is counterfeit. Our hopes, dreams, desires, commitments are 
pathetic ploys that keep us from looking into the deathly abyss hidden just 
below the surface. Nothingness, sheer nothingness, beribboned and 
engraved, is what conceptualists extol in their most fervent prayers and 
what we are to embrace as the only authentic presence. 
If you want a literary allusion, I'd say that postmodernists stand Don 
Quixote on his head. While the man from La Mancha 's fecund imagination 
populates the world with imaginary entities, postmodernist deconstruction 
is bent on turning every meaningful occasion into a simulacrum, an 
existential nonevent. Conceptualists destroy all manners of ideological 
monsters in a bid to liberate humanity from the tyranny of paradigms. 
Along the way, they turn parody onto itself, rendering it largely 
meaningless. For parody feeds on the gap between mask and face, 
appearance and reality, and it becomes superfluous when this gap 
disappears, when the only real thing left is parody itself. Constitutive 
imagination is supplanted with a deconstructive one, grand narrative with 
the self-effacing narrative, constructive paradigm with the self-
deconstructing paradigm, and a self-fulfilling prophecy with a self-
unfulfilling prophecy -- a prophecy that assures its own failure. 
The paradigmatic urge to parody every paradigm produces ideological 
arabesques, political ornaments, moral fugues, and other non- or anti-
narrative art forms. Their nonthematic unity precludes any attempt to 
derive a rationale for action from this absurdist pastiche. If there is any 
morale to be found here, it is a "plague on both your houses," or better 
still, nam tataram vse ravno. . . . Conceptualist aesthetics can be amusing 
or annoying depending on your mood, but it rarely fails to sap ethical 
substance. Liberalism, conservatism, socialism, capitalism, democracy -- 
this ideological claptrap enslaves the one who takes it seriously. The only 
sure way to avoid totalitarian simulacrum is to keep constructive 
imagination at bay and practice decontructive engagement. So, beware of 
pathos and embrace irony, shun commitment and mock politics, poke fun 
and take refuge in the safety of quotation marks, enjoy your solitary play 
and always, always keep your protective irony unwrapped and ready to 
use. 
A characteristic quote from Prigov appears in your book, Mark. In it, 
Prigov juxtaposes Sorokin and Chekhov as the perfect expressions of the 
modernist and postmodernist sensibilities: 
Precisely in his [Chekhov's] writing this exceedingly thin film of nice, 
delicate and touching human relationships is meant to cover up, stave off 
the terrifying subterranean chaos (terrifying from Chekhov's standpoint, of 
course) that threatens to burst out and blow away with its foul breath the 
thin, restraining film of culture. . . . [T]he film with which Sorokin deals 
differs from the one envisioned by Chekhov, and not just in its historical 
particulars but in its cardinally new intent. That is to say, his film no 
longer masks the chaos but clings to man, envelops him, and more than 
that -- it tries to usurp his place, his thoughts and feelings. Having come 
that close to the human being, the film [of civility] brings him that much 
closer to chaos (A. Prigov, "A im kazalos v Moskvu! v Moskvu!", Pp. 117-
116 in Vladimir Sorokin, Moskva: Russlit, 1992). 
It is the modern man who struggles to insulate himself from chaos, Prigov 
seems to tell us; the postmodern man doesn't avert his gaze and stares 
right back at it. He may not bring chaos to heel, but at least he is not 
going to feed himself illusions and half-truths about his ability to tame it. 
Treating absurdity with discursive remedies is like spoon-feeding fish oil to 
someone afflicted with Carposi sarcoma. Trim your political agenda, 
decenter your whole being, anesthetize yourself with irony, and chaos 
won't seem half as bad as it does to a sober-minded man stuck up on 
reason and civility. 
From the discourse-analytical standpoint, sign is the true substance of 
discourse. It is meant to be transparent to meaning, its body completely 
irrelevant to what it signifies. Looked at from this angle, the expression "I 
love you" means the same thing whether it is written or verbalized, 
framed in the 12 pitch or 10 pitch, rendered in capital or small case 
letters, signed in Cyrillic or Japanese script -- its pure sign value stays 
more or less the same. The voice-analytical perspective highlights live 
speech, intonation, vocal delivery -- the iconic/indexical properties of 
communication essential to pragmatist linguistics. What is said is no more 
important than how it is said. The bodily accompaniment has significance 
quite apart from the message's semantic content. Given an ironic twist, 
the expression "I love you" may well mean the opposite of what its purely 
semantic content implies. This is what Bakhtin tried to articulate when he 
criticized Saussurean linguistics and urged attention to utterance, 
intonation, life speech genres. This is what George Mead and Lev 
Vygotsky seemed to have in mind when they urged to move beyond the 
thought-sign toward the larger behavioral context of linguistic 
consciousness. And this is, I take it, what Charles Peirce sought to 
communicate when he brought into one continuum icons, indexes and 
signs. (In my last year at the University of Leningrad I wrote a thesis on 
Mead and Vygotsky, but now I see that it should have also covered Peirce 
and Bakhtin). 
Voice is silently present in every discourse. It is a bio-semiotic event that 
links human discourse to subhuman communication and hints at the 
origins we share with other mammals. This semiotic phenomenon is 
marked by what Peirce calls "firstness" or "iconicity." Voice is a perfect 
example of an icon, of a medium that is also a message. As an iconic body 
of the sign, voice tends to stay in the background of symbolic exchange. It 
does its job as a carrier of arbitrary meaning, the way a "red octagon" at 
the intersection presents itself as a "stop sign." But just as the shape, 
color and position of the stop sign mean something quite apart from the 
sign's intended meaning, the voice in discourse means something quite 
apart from what it was intended to mean. We behold it with all our 
senses, paying special attention to the discrepancies between its 
proclaimed intent and its non-assigned significance. Thus, we look beyond 
the forbidden discourse and identify with an outlaw blessed by a sensible 
voice and withhold our sympathy from a mendacious sheriff or a conniving 
politician spouting a politically correct line. In real life, a communist party 
member can show emotional intelligence even when he dresses his 
message in the official terminological garb, while a dissident espousing 
liberty and justice may acquit oneself as an intolerant person through his 
vocalization. In all such cases, we are attuned to the various levels of 
signification through the tension between iconic, indexical and symbolic 
properties of discourse. 
If voice is an icon marked by firstness, then the emotion it conveys is an 
index characterized by "secondness." As every genuine index, emotion 
partakes in the event about which it testifies without being identical with it 
(weather vane comes to mind as another common example). Emotions 
reveal attitudes that may or may not be readily accessible to the organism 
itself. To the extent that these bodily dispositions become available to the 
individual and are intentionally communicated to others, our emotions 
acquire the quality of "thirdness" and turn into "signals." Sign's body 
begins to shrivel in size and significance at this point. Discourse grows 
oblivious of its vocal substrate as it moves away from live speech to 
written communication. In purely symbolic communication, sign's value is 
effectively severed from the sign's body, which is not supposed to mean 
anything in and of itself, only what members of a language community 
arbitrarily allow it to mean. All consciously signifying activity is, in this 
respect, dissimulating, its iconic significance and indexical proximity to the 
event being sacrificed to its symbolic value. 
As discourse grows autonomous, it comes to dominate and colonize voice. 
It turns into politically correct speech that wants to be taken at face value. 
Politically correct signing subdues messy particulars with patented 
universals in a drive to maximize certainty. Accounting designed to 
capture things themselves systematically glosses over their qualities that 
don't fit the accounting schema. Unfettered voice would have alerted us to 
the recalcitrant particulars tossed around by chaotic crosscurrents, but 
discourse sweeps the mess under the rug and imposes a seal of official 
determination on a muddled situation. Where intonational dynamics 
attuned to uncertainty quickly registers unpredictable changes in the 
situation, discourse stays its course and glosses over the particulars that 
won't fit into its ideological mold. Voice always tells us more than 
discourse intends to. For we aren't just talking heads and mouthpieces for 
master discourses; we are emotionally-charged, full-throated, gut-
wrenching voices whose iconic presence breaks though discourse. Voice 
may turn into a whimper when discursive oppression is overwhelming, it 
may sound like a howl of a wounded animal, it can become temporarily 
inaudible, but it speaks volumes to us if we care to listen and pay close 
attention to its peculiar semantics, syntaxis and style. 
While postmodern hermeneutics privileges discourse over voice, 
pragmatist hermeneutics favors voice over discourse. Unlike the 
postmodernist who is bent on exposing voice as a mouthpiece of discourse 
and reducing it to an archetype through intertextual deconstruction, the 
pragmatist aims to recover voice within discourse, to appropriate a unique 
experience shining through worn-out discursive devices. The relationship 
between voice and discourse is not a transitive one, however. While voice 
is a silent presence in every discourse, the reverse is not necessarily true. 
We can't dialectically invert this proposition and say that discourse is a 
silent presence in every voice. Voice is there before discourse the way 
moaning is there before meaning. Minding precedes mind. Voice-sensitive 
hermeneutics acknowledges that the individual needs some discourse to 
communicate his experience to others, but it is always on the lookout for 
novel, emergent, unpredictable inflections that subvert and update the 
familiar discursive pattern. When the same text appears on more than one 
occasion, it means a different thing. Thus, a quotation from Marx acquires 
a new connotation depending on whether it is invoked by Lenin, Stalin, 
Mao, Lukacs, Gramsci, Lifschitz or Ilienkov. Novel linguistic events 
happen; to recover them, to discern a unique way in which a familiar 
universal has been particularized is the task of pragmatic hermeneutics. 
Postmodernists correctly sense the danger inherent in discourse 
production. Language that speaks us is not just a figure of speech. It 
reflects the all too familiar situation where one is forced to say something 
one couldn't possibly mean, sign feelings one doesn't feel, suppress 
emotions deemed to be politically correct. Hence, the need to rescue voice 
buried under discourse. But is discourse really such a menace? Is it always 
to be blamed? Should we agree with Prigov that "every language harbors 
within itself a totalitarian ambition to conquer the entire world, to cover it 
with its terms and who itself is an absolute truth" (Literaturnaia Gazeta, 
05/12/93 ). To be sure, discourse can be used to clobber people over their 
heads, but it also has therapeutic qualities, it helps us break the strangle 
hold of the dead speech on our minds, and gives exquisite pleasures to 
those who have mastered it. Freud's, Ricoeur's and Habermas's intuitions 
are all on target here. Discourse does a lot more than postmodernists 
would allow. It sickens and it heals, it enslaves and it empowers, it stunts 
creativity and it opens new horizons of meaning -- it is a floating signifier 
to which we attribute agency that rightfully belongs to those who speak 
the discourse. 
Remember Brodsky: "The poet is the instrument of language." This line 
can be read as a variation on Heidegger's maxim "language speaks the 
speaker." Brodsky played with this thesis when he gave a public talk at 
the UNLV a few years ago. I remember him saying that few Russian 
writers dared to immerse themselves in the Russian language and allowed 
its powerful currents to stir them toward truth. He named Platonov as one 
of the exceptions. Solzhenitsyn, he said, had a considerable linguistic 
acumen, but he resisted language, didn't allow himself to be carried away 
by it. There is some important truth encysted in this dictum. But there is 
also some obfuscation. I asked Brodsky, how come Platonov, Solzhenitsyn 
and Brodsky spoke the same Russian language, yet each was deposited 
on a vastly different linguistic shore and had such remarkably different 
insights to offer? Could it be that these individuals were not merely 
hapless instruments in the hands of language but active beings guided in 
their linguistic journeys by their emotional intelligence and moral 
intuition? I need to check with those present how exactly Brodsky 
answered my query, for my memories are rather dim. He might have said 
something to the effect that it is language that lets you have any 
particular insight, but I don't think he joined issue with me. Again, I find 
pragmatist intuitions more inspiring than those that animated Heidegger 
and his postmodernist followers. We only need to take a closer look at 
Soviet discourse to realize that we speak language as much as language 
speaks us. 
If you take postmodernists literally, you would think that Soviet discourse 
completely dominated life in the Soviet Union . Every human being 
appears in this account as a parrot babbling official verbiage. The reality, 
as we know, was more complex. Not all discursive practices fitted the 
official mold. There were semi-official, non-official, dissident, anti-Soviet 
discursive forms that existed along side endless variations on the master 
discourse, variations that sometimes strayed so far from the main theme 
that they effectively became themes in their own right. "Discursive 
genres" strike me as a far better calibrated tool than "master discourse" 
when it comes to accounting for the Soviet speech situation. Following 
Bakhtin, we can picture language as a living continuum extending from 
archetypal myths, mythologems and master discourses to discursive 
fields, speech genres and speech dialects, all the way down to local lingos 
and individual speech variations. What makes this a living continuum is a 
speech act fueled by voice -- a voice that does not let itself to be 
consumed by discourse. I would dare say that there are more discursive 
fields, real or potential, in any modern society than there are individual 
members who partake in them. This applies to a country as repressive as 
the Soviet Union. 
Even before Stalin's death, there were plenty of linguistic forms to chose 
from. After 1953, the choice expanded dramatically. Overlapping or 
independent as they were, Soviet discourses didn't swallow the individual 
completely. The Soviet individual partook in many discursive fields, 
borrowed from different terminological arsenals, and displayed a 
bewildering variety of selves. Discursive fields left him considerable 
leeway as to how the individual would terminate indeterminacy and 
quantify oneself. The self emerging on the intersection of such fields was 
decentered, it spilled over discursive borderlines and was only partially 
predictable. Individual behavior was akin to a wave that moved in all sorts 
of directions, occasionally registering as a particular with a definite 
identity. The Soviet individual never ceased to emerge as a person and 
repeatedly surprised himself and others with his nonconventional role 
playing. Surely, he felt the gravitational pull of various idio-languages, but 
these were only discursive blueprints. Which one would prove decisive in 
shaping his quantum-self often could be predicted, but then only with a 
margin of uncertainty. 
If individual selves continued to emerge in Soviet society, so were 
discursive fields contingent on identities assumed by individuals. Speech 
genres proliferated, discursive communities multiplied, including many 
that had no official stamp of approval. Few if any discursive norms were 
sacred among Soviet citizens. Some were ignored, others given lip 
service, still others honored in the breach. When a certain discursive form 
would grow stale or oppressive, the Soviet individual used irony, parody, 
travesty and kindred vocal strategies intended to dramatize an assumed 
identity as bogus, to highlight one's speech as "merely" official discourse. 
The Soviet individual was a master of his discourse, not its passive victim 
whose identity was stamped on his forehead. For all its simulating and 
dissimulating proclivities, Soviet society didn't abolish reality. Every 
Potemkin portable village needed speakers to lend their voices to official 
discourses. The vocal presence continued to be felt right in the middle of 
an official spectacle. Discursively constructed in this haphazard fashion, 
Soviet society was neither a complete chaos nor a monolithic order but a 
semi-ordered chaos continuously shaped and reshaped by self-conscious 
actors. Which is how human society looks when captured through the 
pragmatist-interactionist optics. "Society transpires here as a universe of 
interferentially overlapping fields, coalescing around symbols and 
meanings and exerting various pressures on individuals caught in their 
gravitational pull. When the borderlines separating these interactional 
fields are strictly policed, they behave like 'bodies,' revealing their 
'corpuscular' qualities. On other occasions, their 'wave-like' properties are 
more in evidence, as crisscrossing identifications whittle away at their 
thingness, making the fields appear as fuzzy, gaseous, easily penetrable 
formations" (Shalin, 1986, Op. Cit., p. 18). 
* * * * 
I have traveled full circle and returned to where I started: chaos, 
uncertainty and moral responsibility. Postmodernists, in my view, come 
down much too hard on discourse and are too pessimistic about our ability 
to lead a sane existence in this absurd world. Their stark and cheerless 
visage of the world steeped in chaos should not be taken literally. As any 
resource, discourse could be misused and abused, but it is a valuable 
resource nonetheless. It helps us get a handle on chaos, to convert it into 
semi-ordered chaos or, if you prefer, semi-chaotic order. Contrary to 
postmodernist wisdom, rhetoric matters. Liberal rhetoric breeds fewer 
totalitarian consequences than communist rhetoric. Democratic discourse 
lets you manage uncertainty in a more humane way than a nondemocratic 
discourse. Looked at from this angle, "democracy is a historically specific 
mode of managing uncertainty. [Its institutions] promote conflicting life-
forms, open up public discourse for an ever-widening range of 
participants, and maximizes public's role in defining the terms in which 
indeterminacy can be legitimately terminated" (Shalin, 1991, p. 266). This 
approach shifts the theoretical focus from the economic to the 
terminological means of production of objective reality. Nondemocratic 
polities seek to monopolize this control, democratic societies decentralize 
it. While the latter system increases the margin of uncertainty and spurs 
dissipative processes, it offers more flexibility and furnishes a greater 
over-all stability than the authoritarian polities do (this is one reason why 
"plan" is currently bowing to "market"). "[Democracy] . . . recognizes that 
uncertainty is inevitable and then turns it to positive account" (John 
Dewey and John Childs, The Educational Frontiers, New York: Appleton-
Century, 1933, p. 309). Indeed, democracy thrives on uncertainty, 
encourages its members to judge particulars for themselves, and compels 
us to revise our universals. It also designates an expansive private 
domain where individuals are left to their own devices and can experiment 
with unorthodox terminological practices. 
Democratic discourse is superior to its alternatives in yet another respect: 
it cultivates human voice and rewards emotional intelligence. These 
qualities indispensable to sane living fall under the heading of civic 
culture. Civic virtue thrives in the emotional culture which promotes trust, 
tolerance, prudence, compassion, humor, and it wilts when overexposed 
to suspicion, hatred, vanity, cruelty and sarcasm (you will find this 
statement reprinted from my newspaper column on the back of our 
conference program). Mistaken are those who pin their hopes on correct 
political "signals" and dismiss emotional littering as mere "noise." The 
vocal medium is very much the message when it comes to politics. While 
emotions that confer dignity on the other are democracy's lifeblood, 
violent emotions that hold others in contempt subvert its sacred thrust. 
Emotional sanity is, consequently, as central to democracy as discursive 
political rationality. 
If democracy is aching today, it is in part because we have neglected the 
emotional intelligence which nourishes it. Civil rights are no substitute for 
civility. Nor is political correctness, whether it comes in radical, liberal, 
conservative, or any other garb. Political correctness is ultimately a failure 
of moral imagination. I use the latter term to designate our ability to wade 
through unwieldy circumstances and bring sanity into this world without 
succumbing to absurd or closing eyes to chaos. You can't bring chaos to 
heel but you can tame it, and then some, if you are willing to makes sense 
together and cultivate your emotional intelligence. This is where Chekhov 
becomes relevant again. 
I couldn't disagree more with Prigov about this remarkable figure on the 
Russian cultural scene. Prigov's take on Chekhov as a quintessential 
modernist and Sorokin as his postmodern antithesis is very clever. It is 
entirely consistent with the Nietzschean ethos of radical postmodernism, 
which dismisses a call for civility as a failure of nerve, a species of feint-
heartedness to be remedied by the robust postmodernist invectives. I 
read Chekhov differently. In my reckoning, Anton Chekhov showed moral 
imagination when he refused to succumb to chaos and urged his 
countrymen to practice political sanity and cultivate emotional intelligence 
in a society that was all messed up. He countered the Russian absurd with 
his tactics of small-scale projects and took solace in civic virtue. His advice 
still rings true today: "Start with yourself, reach out to your neighbors, 
communicate to others your good will, give credit to your enemies 
wherever it is due, have courage to admit when the problem has no ready 
solution, avoid grand-standing and take up small deeds. In sum, make 
sure your emotions are intelligent and your intellect is emotionally sane" 
(forgive me for yet another auto-citation). 
Here is a real life parable that illuminates the small-scale-deeds theory. A 
man is walking down along the seashore after a storm which washed 
ashore countless little sea creatures. A little boy is picking them up, 
throwing them back to see. "Why are you doing this," asks the man. 
"There are hundreds of thousands of them -- what difference does it make 
if you save a few?" The boy picks up another little see horse, returns it to 
its elements, and says: "It makes a difference for this one . . . and for this 
one . . . and for this one. . . ." 
As world-weary adults, postmodernists see no point in trying. They 
allowed themselves to be mesmerized by the enormity of the task and the 
sheer dimensions of chaos. They convinced themselves that constructive 
efforts are absurd in the face of impending destruction and imminent 
death. Hence, their ethics is nihilist, their engagement is deconstructive, 
their ironic strategies are aimed at discourse communities that haven't yet 
fully unraveled. The ethics of uncertainty that pragmatists urge for our 
age rejects cynicism, calls for experimentalism, and appeals to our 
emotional intelligence and moral imagination. This ethics is premised on 
the notion that individual action makes a difference, that it matters 
whether we add a quantum of sanity to this world or stare blankly as it 
sinks into the vortex of insanity, whether we stay ironically aloof when 
someone is consumed by chaos or jump into its current to save a 
struggling soul, whether we use discourse to ridicule speech communities 
or to repair and expand the pluralistic universe. An overdose of ironic 
detachment breeds cruelty that might have been avoided were we to add 
a little pathos to our discursive vocalization. 
Now is a good time to pause and look into the mirror. The reader must be 
wondering if I ever dismount the high moral horse and get down to the 
dirty particulars. Indeed, how much posturing is there in my pragmatist 
rhetoric? Or to put it in more neutral terms, Is there any flesh and blood 
person who meets the standard of emotional intelligence? Sergei 
Averintsev alerted me to this question in his February 4, 1997 , letter to 
me where he offered feedback on my "Notes on the Recessive Genes in 
Russian Culture" (Zvezda, 1995, No. 6). In this article, I talk about the 
Chekhov-Losev's perspective on emotional intelligence and moral 
imagination. "I was puzzled by your reference to A. F. Losev, who boasted 
his contempt for Chekhov," Averintsev writes: 
Please forgive me, but did you read his main works (especially his 
Dialectics of Myth) where he heaps scorn on liberalism and everything that 
reaks of "Renaissance" and "new Europe "? . . . Aleksei Federovich, may 
he rest in peace and glory, was an unusually gifted and hard-working 
man, whose name I cherish, all the more so that for a while I had an 
informal relationship with him and was somewhat of a student of his -- 
but you are talking about quite different things. Far more appropriate 
would be to mention here the name of M. M. Bakhtin who developed the 
concept of dialogical truth and really knew how to talk to people from 
different walks of life. Generally speaking, the lists you compile, especially 
when they are intended for a Russian audience, appear to be 
unexpectedly arbitrary, which raises the question about the genre. When 
the right and the left compile their lists of "our kind of people" and "their 
kind of people" . . . that suites them fine; but can you, who is opposed to 
generalizations and committed to truth as "objective uncertainty," do the 
same? "There are 9 and 60 ways of constructing tribal ways,// And -- 
every -- single -- one -- of -- them -- is -- right!", wrote Kipling (did he 
anticipated postmodernism?); by the same token, there are 9 and 60 
ways of being tolerant, of being intolerant, of [.]mixing tolerance and 
practicing intolerance, and so on. 
I take this to mean that no one has a monopoly on moral imagination. 
Quantum selves that we all are, we always find an occasion to fall flat on 
our faces. I know I do. That is, I espouse emotional intelligence, but I 
can't say my actions are always emotionally sane. Sometimes my voice 
cracks with intonations that make me cringe. And not only when I sing (an 
avocational pursuit), but also in other spheres where my competence is on 
the line. Once again, Chekhov's experience comes to mind. Here is a man 
who hoped to squeeze a slave out of his blood stream, drop by slavish 
drop, and assiduously cultivated intelligentnost. Was he always up to the 
challenge? Not really. Just read his correspondence, check the memoirs of 
his contemporaries, and you will see that he was all too human in 
practicing the craft of living. But he surely tried, and all of us are better 
off for his effort. The quantum of sanity he imparted to the world has 
made it a touch more bearable for all of us. Now, it is incumbent on us to 
try to do the same. 
According to cosmologists, the fate of transgalactic formations, if not of 
the whole universe, turns on the strange happenings in the quantum 
micro-world. Chaos theorists tell us that a little grain of sand can become 
a focal point around which chaos coalesces into a newly emergent order. 
So, maybe the quantum of sanity we bring into the world would ultimately 
determine whether it acts like a semi-chaotic order or a disorderly chaos. 
 
 
 
 
